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SUMMARY
In recent years, the United States has
been unable to maintain an international con-
sensus for strict enforcement of all applicable
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq, but
it has largely succeeded in preventing Iraq
from reemerging as an immediate strategic
threat to the region.  There is U.S. concern
about the long-term threat posed by Iraq, and,
in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the
Bush Administration has said it will prevent
Iraq from re-emerging as a significant threat to
U.S. security.  The exact form of that
Administration stance has not yet been
announced, whether it be through international
sanctions and diplomacy, military action, or
covert action.
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Com-
mission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made consider-
able progress in dismantling and monitoring
Iraq’s mass destruction weapons (WMD)
programs but was unable to finish verifying
Iraq’s claim that it has destroyed all its weap-
ons of mass destruction or related equipment.
Iraq’s refusal of full cooperation with
UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-British
military action in December 1998.  All inspec-
tors withdrew and Iraq has been  unmonitored
since, leaving uncertainty as to whether Iraq
has rebuilt its WMD programs.  
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
as Kuwaiti sovereignty.  Iraq claims that, after
the 1991 war, it lost track of the more than
600 Kuwaitis still missing, and it denies pos-
sessing any more Kuwaiti property taken
during the war.  Neither of these claims is
considered credible by the international com-
munity.  Iraq rejected a 1991 U.N.-sponsored
“oil-for-food” program to address humanitar-
ian needs, but it later accepted a revised ver-
sion of that plan, which has been operational
since December 1996.
Iraq’s compliance in other areas, espe-
cially human rights issues, is still widely
deemed unsatisfactory.  A U.S.-led no-fly zone
has provided some protection to Kurdish
northern Iraq since April 1991.  Since August
1992, a no-fly zone has been enforced over
southern Iraq, where historically repressed
Iraqi Shiites are concentrated.  The zone was
expanded in August 1996, but Iraq nonetheless
maintains a substantial ground presence  in the
south.  Iraq has openly challenged both no-fly
zones since December 1998.  
In late 1998, the Clinton Administration
publicly added a major new dimension to U.S.
Iraq policy — openly promoting a change of
regime.  Accomplishing this additional U.S.
objective  is considered risky and difficult, and
is not openly supported by many other govern-
ments.  The Bush Administration appears to be
building largely on the Clinton Administra-
tion’s Iraq policy framework, but the Adminis-
tration says that rebuilding support for con-
tainment requires easing purely civilian  sanc-
tions.  The opening of a diplomatic dialogue
with Baghdad (the United States suspended
relations with Iraq in January 1991) has not
been under consideration, although Iraq has




President Bush’s January 29, 2002 State of the Union message painted Iraq as part of
an “axis of evil” along with North Korea and Iran, although senior U.S. officials indicate
that  the United States is not planning immediate military action.  On December 20, 2001,
the House, by a vote of 392-12, passed H.J.Res. 75, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit the
inspectors a material breach of its international obligations.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance from the end of the Gulf war
in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council maintained comprehensive
international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports.  The primary ceasefire resolution is
Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), requiring Iraq to end its weapons of mass
destruction programs, recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti
property, and end support for international terrorism.  Iraq is required by Resolution 688
(April 5, 1991) to end repression of its people.  (See also CRS Report RL30472,  Iraq: Oil-
for-Food Program; CRS Report RS20843,  Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime; and
CRS Report RL30728, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
A U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), chaired during July 1, 1997 - June 30, 1999
by Australian disarmament official Richard Butler (succeeding Rolf Ekeus), and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its
prohibited WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program to ensure that
Iraq remains free of WMD (Resolution 715, October 11, 1991).  The monitoring program,
accepted by Iraq in November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of
about 300 sites.  Under Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), UNSCOM inspected (at point
of entry and at end-use destination) of  Iraqi imports of any dual use items.  
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991).
That resolution required unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD
suppliers.  During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi
security service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights.  These
actions prompted  Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as
on June 13, 1997) demanding Iraqi cooperation.  Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened
travel restrictions against Iraqi officials committing the infractions.  Resolution 1134 (October
23, 1997) again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
(France, Russia, China, Egypt, and Kenya abstained.)  
1997-1998 Crises.  Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections and, on November 13, 1997, expelled the Americans.
Resolution 1137 (adopted unanimously November 12, 1997),  imposed travel restrictions on
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Iraqi officials.  (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral
U.S. military action as a last resort.  The Senate did not act on a similar resolution,
S.Con.Res. 71, because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow
Saddam Husayn.)  In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan, respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to
resume inspections.  The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for  access to
eight “presidential sites” by UNSCOM inspectors and diplomatic observers.  Security Council
Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest
consequences” if Iraq reneged.  Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings)
during March 26-April 3, 1998, and the United States agreed to lift the travel ban on Iraqi
officials and to resume sanctions reviews.
 Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for  completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting new facilities.  The Senate and House
passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998), declaring  Iraq in
“material breach” of the ceasefire.  On September 9, 1998, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1194, suspending sanctions reviews.  On October 30, 1998, the Security
Council offered an easing of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding
requirements, but Iraq demanded an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation
with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).  The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi action a  “flagrant violation” of the
February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement.  On November 14, 1998, with the United States about
to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, narrowly averting U.S. air strikes but
prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.  
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath.  After a month of testing Iraq’s
cooperation,  UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-
related documents and that it was obstructing inspections; the IAEA did not issue similar
complaints.  All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour U.S. and British bombing campaign
followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-
capable facilities and military and security targets.  After almost one year of negotiations
among Security Council members on how to restart inspections, the Council adopted
Resolution 1284 (December 17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia, France, China, and
Malaysia abstained).  Resolution 1284 provided for the  suspension of most sanctions if Iraq
fully cooperates with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission), although Iraq’s revenues would be subject to
undefined financial controls, exports of dual use items to Iraq would still require U.N.
approval, and arms exports would remain banned.  
In January 2000, the Security Council selected as head of UNMOVIC former IAEA
director Hans Blix, who formulated an organizational plan adopted on April 13, 2000.  He
reported in August 2000 that UNMOVIC was ready to begin preliminary activities in Iraq,
but Iraq has refused it entry to date.  During February 26-27, 2001, Iraq conducted talks with
the U.N. Secretary General about restarting inspections, but the talks made little progress. 
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy.  Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the
post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq and amid fears that Iraq could provide WMD
expertise to terrorist groups, on November 26, 2001, and again in his January 29, 2002 State
of the Union message – in which he described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” along with Iran
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and North Korea –  President Bush appeared to threaten unspecified action if Iraq did not
readmit U.N. weapons inspectors.  This followed calls from several members of Congress for
the overthrow of Saddam and House passage of  H.J.Res. 75 on December 20, 2001, by a
vote of 392-12.  The joint resolution says that Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors is a
material breach of its international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security,
but does not explicitly authorize U.S. military action.  In January 2002, amid growing U.S.
threats, Iraq made overtures to the United Nations to resume that inspections dialogue, and
a meeting between Annan and Iraq’s Foreign Minister to discuss new inspections is scheduled
for March 7, 2002.  Comments by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on February 24, 2002,
suggested that the United States would back new inspections only if such inspections were
unconditional and comprehensive, a standard that some Administration officials believe Iraq
will never meet.  Several Western and most Arab governments are opposed to a U.S. military
campaign against Iraq.  Critics of an attack on Iraq believe such a campaign would lack
international support and not be assured of removing Saddam Husayn easily.  Advocates of
ousting Saddam believe that if he remains in power, Iraq will eventually rebuild and use WMD
against the United States, directly or through terrorist groups.
The January 30, 2002 CIA proliferation assessment for Congress, covering January to
June 2001, repeats U.S. suspicions of Iraqi rebuilding of and research on WMD but presents
little hard evidence of such activity.  There are also allegations of illicit Iraqi imports of
conventional military equipment.  A Jane’s Defence Weekly report of July 25, 2001, says Iraq
has been illicitly obtaining spare parts for fighter jets and helicopters from Belarus, Ukraine,
and the former Yugoslavia.  
 The following sums up the status of disarmament efforts in Iraq and outstanding issues.
Nuclear Program
During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it had no nuclear weapons
facilities or unsafeguarded  material, UNSCOM/IAEA uncovered and dismantled a
previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities, including three
clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope
separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program.  Inspectors found and
dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons development program, and they
found evidence of development of a radiological weapon, which scatters nuclear material
without  an explosion.  No radiological weapon was ever completed, but there is debate over
whether Iraq ever tested such a device.  UNSCOM removed from Iraq all discovered nuclear
reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated.  Following the defection of Husayn Kamil (Saddam’s
son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq revealed it had launched
a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon within one year, and that it had
planned to divert fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. 
The IAEA, before it ceased work in Iraq, said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been
ended and that it had a relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers.  A May 15,
1998 Security Council statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement  to close the nuclear file
if Iraq cleared up outstanding  issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of
some nuclear equipment), but an IAEA report of July 1998, indicated that some questions still
remained.  The United States did not agree to close the file.  In January 2002, as it has in each
of the past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed,
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acting under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  However,
in May 2000, the IAEA destroyed an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan
in 1991.  The IAEA says that the absence of an inspections program creates uncertainty about
Iraqi nuclear activities.  The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about 7,000
scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program. 
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 690
tons of agents, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of  production equipment
items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14, 1994.  However, the fate
of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical
precursors, remains unknown.  Iraq refused to yield an Air Force document, found in July
1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq allowed UNSCOM to take
notes from it.  In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996
contained 97% pure mustard gas, raising the possibility that it was freshly produced.
The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which
Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile was ever
located.  By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to
admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported
enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent.  In late June 1998,
UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab,
contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing
the agent.  Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX.  About
170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring.  Iraq has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997.  Recent U.S. government reports to
Congress, including the CIA report to Congress on January 30, 2002, have said Iraq has
rebuilt some facilities that could be easily converted to chemical weapons production.
  
Biological Weapons
Iraq did not declare any biological materials, weapons, research, or facilities in its initial
declaration to UNSCOM in April 1991, and no biological stockpile was ever uncovered.
UNSCOM focused initially on the major research and development site at Salman Pak (gutted
and partially buried by Iraq shortly before the first inspection began) and later on the Al
Hakam facility south of Baghdad (dismantled by UNSCOM June 20, 1996).  In August 1991,
Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research program.  In July 1995, Iraq modified
its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive biological weapons program and that it
had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of  aflatoxin
and clostridium.  In August 1995, Iraq confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs,
of which  25 were missile warheads, loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in
the Gulf war, but Iraq claims to have destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict.  UNSCOM
monitored 86 biological sites during 1994 -1998. 
UNSCOM’s position was  that Iraq’s biological  declarations were not credible or
verifiable.  According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for
producing biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for.
UNSCOM still lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol
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generators for biological dissemination, as well as the fate of the biological munitions.  In
early April 2001, Iraq wrote to Secretary General Annan that it plans to refurbish the Doura
laboratory, destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996 on the grounds it could be used for biological
weapons.  Iraq says it needs the plant to produce vaccines against foot and mouth disease.
The October 2001 anthrax-related terrorism in the United States has generated
suspicions of Iraqi involvement because Iraq developed anthrax as part of its biological
program.  No evidence linking the anthrax to Iraq has been announced, and White House
spokespersons said in late December 2001 that the anthrax used in the attacks appeared to
be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military laboratory.
Ballistic Missiles
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires the destruction of all Iraqi ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.  UNSCOM accounted for 817 of 819
Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war, as well as all 14 declared
mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads.  U.S. and British analysts, contrary to
UNSCOM’s assessments, believe Iraq might be concealing 10 to 12 Russian-supplied Scud-
type missiles.  UNSCOM’s last regular report (October 1998) said it had been able to account
for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological (CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally
destroyed in 1991.  (The warheads were unearthed in mid-1998.)  An additional 30 chemical
warheads were previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.  UNSCOM also
accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads, and said it had made progress toward
establishing a material balance for Scud engine components.  Unresolved issues include
accounting for missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile propellant, and
indigenous missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).
In December 1995, after Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance
components allegedly bound for Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile
components since 1991, a clear violation of sanctions.  (That month, UNSCOM retrieved
prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes, suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s
Tigris River, apparently procured from Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.)  UNSCOM
also had evidence that Iraq, after the Gulf war, conducted secret flight tests and conducted
research on missiles of prohibited ranges.  Iraq is making progress in developing permitted-
range missiles – the Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002 CIA
report to Congress  and, prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63
missile sites and 159 items of equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles.  U.S. military
officials said after Desert Fox that the bombing had set back Iraq’s missile program by two
years, damaging short-range missile production facilities including Taji, Ibn al-Haythim, Al
Kindi, and Al Karama.
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq
as a gross violator of  human rights.  In 1994, the Administration said it might, at some point,
present a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948 Genocide
Convention.  U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report said that
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Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in southern
Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live.  In February 2002, Iraq allowed  the
U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis of Cyprus, to visit Iraq, marking
the first such visit since 1992.  Mavromatis expects to make a more extended visit later in
2002.
War Crimes Trial.  U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraqi atrocities to the United Nations.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991,
section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President should propose to the U.N.
Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Husayn.  In later years, similar legislation
was passed by one or both chambers, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House
November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78, (passed the Senate March 13, 1998); and a provision
of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998).
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. Army conducted research into possible
war crimes; the report was released on March 19, 1993, after Clinton took office.  Since
April 1997, the Administration has supported  INDICT, a private organization that publicizes
alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the arrest of 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals.  Although
apparently lacking international support, in August 2000, U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War
Crimes David Scheffer said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal
established within six months, focusing on  “nine major criminal episodes.”  These include
the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing
5,000 Kurds) and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in
which an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons use against
Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes against
Kuwait (oil fires, for example) and coalition forces; and other allegations.  On December 1,
2000, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for an Iraq war crimes tribunal.
In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State Department plans to contribute $4 million to a
U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission, ” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war crimes is
formed.  (For more information on U.S. funding for Iraqi war crimes issues, see CRS Report
RS20843, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.)
Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees
Desert Storm and postwar rebellions against Saddam created a flood of Iraqi refugees,
including 39,000 Iraqis in a camp in Saudi Arabia (Rafha).  Of that pool, about 14,000 were
ex-soldiers (and their family members) that participated in postwar rebellions or had
surrendered to coalition forces.  The Bush Administration (1989-1993) agreed to participate
in a multinational resettlement recommended by UNHCR.  The total admitted to the United
States under the program were about 29,000 Iraqis, of which about 3,800 were ex-soldiers
and their families.  About 5,000 Iraqis remain in Saudi Arabia as refugees, and the United
States is not resettling any more Iraqis.  The FY1994 defense authorization (P.L. 103-160)
stated the sense of the Senate that there be no admissions of Iraqi ex-soldiers unless they are
certified to have assisted coalition forces after defecting and have not committed any war
crimes; the Administration says these criteria were met.  In the wake of the September 1996
northern Iraq crisis, 5,900 Kurds who worked for U.S. relief operations or U.S.-affiliated
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NGO’s in northern Iraq, as well as 650 opposition activists, were resettled in the United
States under the Attorney General’s parole authority.
Support for International Terrorism/September 11
Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq made
a declaration to that effect to the U.N. Security Council.  Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism, and according to the State Department’s report on international
terrorism for 2000, continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine
Liberation Front of Abu Abbas.  Some press reports say that U.S. intelligence has received
reports that Iraqi officials have, in the past, met with some of the September 11 hijackers and
with bin Laden himself.  Partly based on these reports, some U.S. officials have argued that
the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks should include military action against Iraq or
other action to destabilize Saddam Husayn.  Iraq  denies any ties to bin Laden’s network and
any involvement in the September 11 attacks or the anthrax mailings.  (See CRS Report
RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001.)
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below.  However, in contrast
to Resolution 687, Resolution 1284 does not make the easing of any sanctions contingent
upon  Iraqi compliance on these Kuwait-related issues.
Border Delineation and Security/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N.
Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border, and established a demilitarized zone
10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into Kuwait.  Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992)
endorsed border decisions taken by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission
(established May 2, 1991); on November 23, 1992, the Commission finished demarcating the
Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October 1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait.
The border took effect January 15, 1993.  The demarcation deprived Iraq of part of the port
of Umm Qasr and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which straddles the border.  On March 18,
1993, the Commission determined the sea border, allowing both countries access to the Gulf,
and its final report was accepted by the U.N. Secretary General on May 20, 1993.  Resolution
833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation.  On
November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Husayn,
but Iraqi officials routinely make statements that Kuwait interprets as threatening.  
The 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by
Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), continues to monitor border violations.  The United
States contributes 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which is commanded (as
of December 1, 1997) by an Irish officer and is considered a U.N. peacekeeping operation.
Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after  Iraqi incursions into the demilitarized
zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member Bengali troop contingent
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supplements the observer group.  Kuwait furnishes two-thirds of UNIKOM’s $51 million
annual budget.  In FY2000, the United States contributed about $4.5 million to UNIKOM.
Return of Kuwaiti Missing Persons and Property
Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other
nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis.  Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608
are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May 2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi
nationals.  Iraq has admitted to having arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not
provide enough information to resolve their fate.  Only three cases have been resolved since
1995.  Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait
border, along with U.S., British, French, and Saudi representatives, but Iraq has boycotted
the meetings since Operation Desert Fox.  In February 2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli
Vorontsov was appointed to a new post (created by Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator
on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and unreturned property.  Iraq has not yet allowed
him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and August 2000, as well as in March, April, and June
2001, the Security Council has issued statements of concern about the lack of progress.  The
U.N. Secretary General’s August 15, 2001 report on the issue said Iraq continued to be
uncooperative.  
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property seized
from Kuwait.  In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti civilian
and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles, and a June
2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did note that
Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.”  However, since 1994, U.S. officials
have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was never
part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of  using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers during
Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border.  The United Nations and Kuwait
say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as well as
military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting vehicles,
90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank missiles, and
675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries.  Iraq claims the materiel was left behind or
destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. 
Reparations Payments
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced
from 305 in December 2000) of  the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales.  As of September 28, 2001,
of a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted, the Compensation Commission
(UNCC) has thus far approved claims worth about $35.4 billion.  Following a July 2001
payout of about $500 million, which included a $74 million payment to Israel for Iraq’s Gulf
war Scud attacks,  the UNCC has paid out about $12.7 billion.  The Commission has paid
some corporate and governmental claims.  I n September 2000, the UNCC governing council
approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion for oil revenues lost because of the Iraqi
occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning oil wells), although current payment
schedules will provide only a small fraction of that award (about $50 million) until 2003.  In
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June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in payments to all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors
(except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war environmental damage.  Of this amount, $5 million
was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses to counter the expected environmental reparations
claims.  On September 27, 2001, the UNCC approved $365 million in payments to
corporations in Turkey, Kuwait, Britain, Germany, and Israel.  
Several legislative proposals to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about $2.2 billion) in the
United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not enacted, because of
differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority.  In the 107th Congress,
H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S. victims of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.  Some might argue that this group of claimants is covered under the U.N.
process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United States should be used for
those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion.  (See CRS Report 98-240,
Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people have grown, the United States
has had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions.  The oil-for-food
program, established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) but in operation only since
December 1996, has been progressively eased to alleviate human suffering, and the United
States has eased  its own unilateral sanctions to align them with the oil-for-food program.
(For a discussion of the program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program.)
Of the Security Council permanent members, the United States has been the most resistant
to easing sanctions and has set the highest standards for full Iraqi compliance.  The United
States rules out dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of  compliance does not
justify talks.  
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative.  During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East,
Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to
Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq.  The
Administration has portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing
differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion.  France, Russia, and
China appear to believe that the U.S objective is to keep sanctions on Iraq in order to
promote regime change, and these and other countries have been increasingly vocal in
promoting an easing of Iraq sanctions.
With phase nine of the oil-for-food program due to expire on June 3, 2001, the Security
Council debated integrating the U.S. plan into an authorization for phase ten.  Failing to reach
agreement, the Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1352 on June 1, 2001, extending
phase nine by one month with no changes.  Russian opposition prevented Security Council
adoption of the U.S. plan by the July 3, 2001 deadline, leading to a Council decision to
authorize a 5-month phase ten of the program, with no alterations (U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1360).  Iraq resumed exporting oil, which it had suspended on June 1, 2001, in
protest of the U.S. proposals.  Not wanting to jeopardize Russian or moderate Arab
cooperation with the war against the Taliban and bin Laden, on November 29, 2001, the
United States and Russia, along with the other Security Council members,  agreed
(Resolution 1382) to authorize a phase eleven with no changes.  There was consensus to
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work, by the time of the next rollover (May 30, 2002), to agree on a list of goods that would
still require review for export to Iraq; a draft listed was attached to Resolution 1382.  The
United States and Russia also agreed to work to obtain the return of weapons inspectors to
Iraq, perhaps in exchange for a broad easing of sanctions under Resolution 1284 (December
1999).  U.S. and Russian negotiators met to discuss the issue in early February 2002.
According to a Washington Post story of January 16, 2002, in December 2001 the United
States released holds on $200 million worth of proposed Russian exports to Iraq in order to
enlist Russian support for the new sanctions regime.  
Another issue is that of international flights to Iraq.  Since August 2000, France, Russia,
and several of Iraq’s neighbors have challenged the U.S. interpretation that U.N. Resolution
670 (September 25, 1990) bans passenger flights to and from Iraq; and there has been a
revival of significant air traffic into and from Iraq.  (The resolution bans flights carrying
“cargo,” except humanitarian cargo, subject to Sanctions Committee approval.)  In early
November 2000, Iraq restarted passenger flights within Iraq and  its officials have begun
flying directly to other countries.  The United States has not objected to the internal flights.
France, Russia, and China might also seek to permit new investment in Iraq’s energy
sector.  Such investment is provided for by Resolution 1284 only after Iraq fully complies on
outstanding WMD issues.  Chinese, Russian, and French firms already have agreed to specific
energy investment projects in Iraq, under the condition that the investment ban is lifted.  As
a possible sign of some easing on this issue, in February 2001 the Sanctions Committee
approved plans by two Russian companies (Zarubezhneft and Tatneft) to drill about 100 wells
in existing fields in Iraq.  The Sanctions Committee also approved a contract between
Baghdad  and Ankara, signed in  December 2001, for a Turkish energy firm to drill 20 wells
near Kirkuk.  
Previous negotiations on Iraq sanctions sought to prevent Iraq from skirting oil-for-food
guidelines in the course of exporting oil.  There are continued reports that small oil trading
companies are paying Iraq these surcharges, and, in April 2001, the U.S. government warned
U.S. firms against buying Iraqi oil from traders that are paying the surcharge.  In early 2002,
the United States and Britain persuaded the Sanctions Committee to institute a new oil pricing
mechanism that would keep Iraq’s price closer to the world price and cut down the margin
for surcharging.  The U.N. official in charge of the oil-for-food program said the new
mechanism was affecting the oil contracting process to the point that Iraq’s oil exports have
fallen about 25%, from about 2.1 million barrels per day (mbd) to about 1.5 mbd. 
Formally, comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since
Iraq’s 1990 invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of
August 6, 1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513).  Since
then, U.S. trade regulations have been amended to align them with the oil-for-food program.
A summary of the regulations governing transactions with Iraq is provided in CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.  U.S. imports of Iraqi oil have soared since 1999 and
reached a high of about 970,000 barrels per day in May 2001 — nearly half of Iraq’s oil
exports.  In the 107th Congress, S. 1170, introduced July 12, 2001, would bar U.S. imports
of Iraqi oil.  A measure introduced in the 107th Congress (H.R. 742), seeks to ease civilian
sanctions while preserving military sanctions and would have eased the licensing procedures
for U.S. sales of goods to Iraq under oil-for-food.
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Prior to the oil-for-food program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of
U.N. resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct
contributions — to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 1992).  Total
U.S. transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other countries,
reached $200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778.  These  transfers were
being repaid to the United States from proceeds of the oil-for-food program.  Resolutions
1284 and 1302 (June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000; about  $173
million was due back to the United States.  Repayments resumed in 2001.
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the
United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments to enforce the sanctions
regime.  Improving sanctions enforcement by Iraq’s neighbors is key to the U.S. targeted
sanctions proposals, although, by all accounts, this part of the U.S. plan has run into
significant resistance in the region.  See  CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.
Jordan.  Since 1992, despite Jordan’s economic linkages with Iraq and its advocacy
of easing sanctions, the United States has considered Jordan’s compliance with the U.N.
sanctions regime on Iraq satisfactory.  In October 2000, Jordan dismissed Lloyd’s
International from its role as inspector of goods bound for Iraq and arriving in Jordan at the
port of Aqaba, a role enshrined in an agreement between Jordan and the United States in
1993.  Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the  Sanctions Committee “takes note of”
Jordan’s  purchases of discounted Iraqi oil and oil products, which is exchanged for Jordanian
goods (approved under the oil-for-food program) and write-downs in Iraqi debt to Jordan.
This relationship was renewed in November 2000  at a level of about $450 million for the
year, which translated into about 90,000 barrels per day of Iraqi oil exports to Jordan.  On
November 1, 2001, Iraq agreed to provide 10% more oil to Jordan in the coming year.
Every year since FY1994,  foreign aid appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306,
P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118, P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, and P.L. 106-429),
have denied U.S. aid to any country that does not comply with the sanctions against Iraq,
though these laws do not mention Jordan specifically.  The Administration has routinely
waived sanctions in order to provide aid to Jordan, which is a key U.S. ally in the Middle East
peace process;  Congress has not objected to that waiver.  Secretary of State Powell has
pressed Jordan not to proceed with a planned “free trade agreement” with Iraq that, some
fear, could increase the flow of dual use goods to Iraq.  It should be noted that virtually all
trade with Iraq is, in practice, duty free.  (See CRS Issue Brief IB93085, Jordan: U.S.
Relations and  Bilateral Issues).  In December, Jordan approved a project to build an oil
pipeline from Iraq to Jordan, to be operational by 2005.  
Turkey.  Turkey estimates that it has lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions.  The
Turkish government now regulates and taxes the illicit importation of about $400 million per
year in Iraqi energy products by Turkish truck drivers returning from Iraq.  That truck traffic
resumed in January 2002 at a low level after a 4-month shut down by Iraq - an Iraqi effort to
punish the Kurds who earn customs revenue from the trade.  U.S. sanctions against Turkey
for this trade have routinely been waived.  In April 2000, Iraq and Turkey neared agreement
to increase bilateral trade to about $2.5 billion per year, roughly pre-war levels.  Turkey
returned an Ambassador to Iraq in January 2001.
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Iran/Persian Gulf States.  In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships lead a
Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian Gulf
to prevent the smuggling of oil and other high-value exports.  The United States has asserted
that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been helping Iraq smuggle out the oil exports in
exchange for “protection fees,” although Iran did stop some illicit shipments in mid-2000,
earning some U.S. praise.  Despite these exceptions, Iran’s cooperation helped Iraq’s illicit
exportation reach a high in mid-2000 of about $80 million per month, and Iraq reportedly
earned a net of about $600 million for all of 2000, according to British military officials.  It
should be noted that Iraq receives only half the export value after paying off the
Revolutionary Guard and smugglers.  The U.S. Ambassador to the UAE said  in March  2001
that the smuggling through this route had fallen substantially in recent months, indicating that
Iraq is increasing its use of a pipeline to Syria (see below).  In October 2001, the United
Nations produced evidence of continued illicit oil exports through the Gulf.
Iranian-Iraqi relations have improved since 1995, including talks between Iraq’s Vice
President and Iranian President Mohammad Khatemi at the margins of the summit in Tehran
(December 9-11, 1997) of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).  The two
exchanged 6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and smaller batches of
prisoners and remains since.  In early October 2000, the two agreed to abide by the 1975
Algiers Accords that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister visited later in the
month, a sign of accelerating rapprochement.  Iraq’s Foreign Minister visited Iran in January
2002, and Iran released over 600 Iraqi prisoners still held.  Regarding Iraq’s relations with
the Gulf monarchy states, in April 2000, the UAE and Bahrain reopened embassies in
Baghdad, leaving Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as the only two Gulf monarchies without relations
with Iraq.  Saudi Arabia is slowly increasing direct trade with Iraq but has not re-established
political  relations.  Kuwait has refused to resume significant official contact with Iraq,
although there is some debate within Kuwait over whether to do so.  Kuwait and Iraq could
not agree on a final statement on their relations or on Iraq sanctions during the Arab League
summit in Jordan (March 27-28, 2001), but Iraq is planning to try to reach agreement with
Kuwait on a statement at a March 2002 Arab summit. 
Syria/Lebanon/Egypt.  Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by
reopening their border in 1997; this trend has continued since the July 2000 accession of
Bashar Assad to the presidency of Syria.  Since late 1998, the two countries have benefitted
from the reopening of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and Iraq has been sending
about 150,000 - 180,000 barrels per day of oil through the line, under a bilateral “swap”
arrangement in which Syria uses the oil domestically and exports an equivalent extra amount
of its own oil.  Because of discounts offered to Syria for the oil, Iraq earns about $1-2 million
per day from this illicit exportation, skirting the oil-for-food program.  Resolution 1284
(paragraph 16) lays the groundwork for the opening of this route, but Syria and Iraq are
resisting controls on this trade.  Syria has not implemented its pledge to Secretary of State
Powell, made during his February 2001 visit to Damascus, that Syria would place the pipeline
under oil-for-food guidelines, and press reports say the Bush Administration has not pressed
Syria hard to uphold this commitment in order to earn Syrian cooperation in the war on
terrorism.  In May 2001, Iraq and Syria reopened diplomatic missions in each others’ capitals.
Lebanon, which is under the heavy influence of Syria, restored diplomatic relations with
Iraq  October 23, 1998, after a 4-year break.  As a sign of warming Iraqi-Egyptian relations,
Iraqi-Egyptian trade under the oil for food program and other trade has now reached $1.7
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billion annually.  On January 18, 2001, the two countries signed a “free trade agreement,”
although under the condition that it goes into effect when sanctions are lifted.  In November
2000, Iraq and Egypt upgraded their interest sections to embassies.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The post-September 11 debate on Iraq encompasses the question of whether the United
States will increase support for the Iraqi opposition.  The main recipient of U.S. aid is the
umbrella group Iraqi National Congress (INC).  For FY2001, the United States was to
provide about $25 million for opposition activities, although the Bush Administration has
continued a Clinton Administration policy of refusing to allow the use of funds for INC
activities inside Iraq.  The policy is based on an assessment that the opposition is not
sufficiently developed politically to infiltrate Iraq.  The State Department instead has been
releasing money (about $2.4 million per month) to help the INC fund its existing operations
and to fund clandestine broadcast operations.  As of February 2002, the Iraqi opposition has
received $24 million in ESF since 1998, with $19 million still to be obligated out of $43
million appropriated.  The FY2002 foreign aid bill (H.R. 2506, conference report H.Rept.
107-345) contains a provision authorizing the expenditure of Economic Support Funds (ESF)
in FY2002 to change the Iraqi regime, although no dollar amount is specified.  The
conference report also contains language expressing congressional concern about the results
of a State Department audit of the INC’s use of U.S.-provided funds and suggesting that the
U.S. consider funding other opposition groups in addition to the INC.  U.S. aid to the INC
was temporarily cut off in January 2002 because of the concerns raised in the audit, although
monthly expense funds began flowing again at  the end of the month.  For a discussion of the
U.S. regime change policy, including the various opposition movements backed by the United
States and the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338), see CRS Report RS20843, Iraq: U.S.
Efforts to Change the Regime.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
The current U.S. military posture in the Persian Gulf is focused on containing and
deterring Iraq, and some experts believe that a U.S. decision to overthrow Saddam would
entail the use of U.S. forces.  Currently, the United States and Britain enforce two “no fly
zones” to provide a measure of protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other objects of
regime repression and to contain Iraq militarily.  To enforce the no-fly  zones, the two allies
invoke U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990, authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from
Kuwait),  687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights), and the Safwan Accords
(the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the coalition forces that banned
Iraqi interference with allied air operations).  Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and are interpreted as
allowing military action to enforce these resolutions.  Resolution 688 (human rights) was not
written under Chapter VII, nor does that or any other resolution establish no fly zones.  To
justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from Resolution
1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-compliance.  Section
1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992, signed December 5, 1991,
expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve the goals of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 687.  (For information on the U.S. military posture in the Gulf tasked with
containing Iraq, see CRS Report RL30728, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000.)  In
instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other infractions, the Administration also has
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cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of  January 12, 1991, authorizing military
action to expel Iraq from Kuwait).
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW).  The northern no fly zone was set up
in April 1991, to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq.  The zone extends north of the 36th
parallel.  After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects
of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation.  On June 25, 2001, Turkey
renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and
about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces).  However, Turkey fears that ONW protects the
anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq,
and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997. 
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Mas’ud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections.  In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing.  In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government.  With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force).  The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for  peacekeeping  (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DoD drawdowns for vehicles and
communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).  Also set up was a peace supervisory group
consisting of the United States, Britain, Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens.
A tenuous cease-fire has held since November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an
agreement in Washington in September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding
issues (sharing of revenues and control over the Kurdish regional government).  None of
these issues has been fully resolved, but reconciliation efforts have shown substantial progress
thus far in 2001.  Both parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National
Congress, but both also maintain ties to Baghdad.  In mid-December 2000, Iraqi troops
briefly took up positions just inside the Kurdish enclave, but did not launch an attack.
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch.  Shiites constitute a  majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed.  The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S.
containment strategy.  The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded
the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely
after  Desert Fox.  In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994,
Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to
threaten its neighbors.  The United States and Britain interpret this as authorizing military
action if Iraq enhances (in numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied
aircraft enforcing the zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the
activated missile batteries.  On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck
elements of that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing
ability to target U.S. aircraft.  U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone, but the strike was
criticized  internationally. 
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Suggesting less U.S. vigilance in its no-fly zone enforcement, coalition aircraft struck
Iraqi air defense targets only about 25 times in 2001, despite being fired on by Iraq over 50
times, compared to 47 different strikes in 2000.  The U.S. strike activity has continued to be
relatively low since September 11, despite the post-September 11 debate over stepped-up
U.S. action against Iraq.  
Costs of Containment.  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm, all
of which has been paid.  From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2000, the Defense
Department has incurred about $8 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide humanitarian
aid to the Kurds.  Of that, about $1.14 billion was spent in FY2000, and just under $100
million was spent for Operation Desert Fox.  About $1.1 billion was spent in FY2001, and
an FY2001 defense appropriation (H.R. 4576, P.L. 106-259, signed August 9, 2000)
provided $3.938 billion in emergency spending for operations over Iraq and in Bosnia and
Kosovo.)  The Department of Defense, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a), assisted UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights
(suspended since the December 15, 1998 UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel,
equipment, and logistical support, at a cost of about $15 million per year.  (See CRS Issue
Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement.)
